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Abstract
This paper studies repeated games where the time of repetitions of the stage game is not known or
controlled by the players. Many economic situations of interest where players repeatedly interact
share this feature, players do not know exactly when is the next time they will be called to
play again. We call this feature random monitoring. We show that perfect random monitoring
is always superior to perfect deterministic monitoring when players discount function is convex
in time domain. Surprisingly when the monitoring is imperfect but public the result does not
extend in the same absolute sense. The positive e¤ect in the players discounting is not su¢ cient to
compensate for a larger probability of punishment for all frequencies of play. However, we establish
conditions under which random monitoring allows e¢ ciency gains on the value of the best strongly
symmetric equilibrium payo¤s, when compared with the classic deterministic approach.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many economic situations where agents repeatedly interact resemble and are studied as
repeated games. While the research in repeated games as focus exclusively on the case
where the repeated game is played at predetermined and equally spaced moments in time,
this paper consider the possibility that the stage game is played at random and not equally
spaced moments in time. In other words, we step further to meet the economic reality that
suggests that indeed many economic interactions of interest are in fact similar to repeated
games but not necessarily repeated with the same known frequency. Players do not know
and do not control the moments in time in which they are called to play the stage game.
Under this possibility, form a technical point of view we then ask, what changes have
to be introduce in the usual repeated games methodology in order to accommodate such a
possibility? And in particular from an e¢ ciency perspective, we are concerned on how the
repeated games payo¤s change when there is uncertainty about the time of repetitions of
the stage game, compared with the usual case. This paper addresses the answers to these
questions, not only when the monitoring is perfect but also when it is public and imperfect12.
We show that under perfect monitoring, random monitoring is always superior to de-
terministic monitoring when players discount function is convex in time domain. Their
decisions are then based on a larger discount factor, we call it the expected discount fac-
tor e¤ect. Surprisingly when the monitoring is imperfect but public the result does not
extend in the same absolute sense. The positive e¤ect on the players discounting is not
su¢ cient to compensate potential adverse e¤ects on the distribution of the public signals for
all frequencies of play. However, we establish conditions under which random monitoring
allows e¢ ciency gains on the value of the best strongly symmetric equilibrium payo¤s, when
1 When monitoring is imperfect but public player commonly observe a noisy public signals about other
players actions. See Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986) where the output of a partnership is a noisy
signal of playersactions, or Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983) where the market price is an
imperfect signal of the quantities supplied by rms. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Mailath and
Samuelson (2006) for complete surveys of the problems and methods used to solve repeated games.
2 The case where the stage game is repeated at unknown and not equally spaced moments in time, we call
it random monitoring. When the stage game is repeated at known and equally spaced moments in time
we call it deterministic monitoring. These concepts should not be confused with perfect or imperfect
monitoring. Perfect monitoring can be either random or deterministic, and the same with imperfect
monitoring.
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compared with the classic deterministic approach.
The study of random monitoring, as done in the present paper, would not be possible
without the recent advances in the theory of frequent monitoring. After the seminal work of
Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991), renewed interest in frequent monitoring has reemerged
in particular due to Sannikov (2007). In the spirit of the latter work, that is, studying
repeated games directly in continuous time, see Faingold (2006) and Faingold and Sannikov
(2007). More similar to the former work, that is, studying the limit of the discrete time
games, see Fudenberg and Levine (2007 and 2008), Osório-Costa (2008) and Sannikov and
Skrzypacz (2007a and b).
In this paper we do not focus in a particular monitoring intensity but rather we study
discrete time games for the all spectrum of monitoring frequencies where repeated play can
improve over the static Nash payo¤s. For that reason the approach followed by the latter
contributions is elected. Even though that these papers where mainly concern with the
answer to the limit case, by studying the associated sequence of discrete time it is possible
to study repeated games for arbitrary monitoring intensities.
Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) show that the value of the best strongly symmetric
equilibrium degenerate in the limit when the realizations of the public process represent bad
news. The lack of observed public signals becomes innitely likely in the limit. Fudenberg
and Levine (2007) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007a) present a similar result when the
public signal is Brownian rather than Poisson. Their degeneracy e¤ect is due to a degradation
of the information content of the public signals for high monitoring intensities.
When the realizations of the public process are interpreted as bad news, Abreu, Milgrom
and Pearce (1991) have shown, under some conditions, that equilibrium payo¤s above the
static Nash, but not e¢ cient can be sustained in the limit. It is also in the limit that the
most e¢ cient equilibrium is achieved. Under Brownian uncertainty, Osório-Costa (2008)
presents a similar result but e¢ cient in the limit, where payo¤s improve monotonically with
the monitoring intensity.
Monitoring is in general a costly activity. For that reason there is an enormous spectrum
of potential applications for the results of the present paper, not only in repeated games
and dynamic game theory in general, but also in the theory of contracts and mechanism
design. Once we identify when random monitoring is superior to deterministic monitoring
(and consequently, the other way around), we can select the monitoring technology that
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achieves larger payo¤s for a same monitoring frequency3 (The same expected costs) or from
another perspective we x the payo¤ and search for the less costly monitoring.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the repeated game model and
notation that is common for both the perfect and imperfect monitoring cases. Special
attention is given to the expected discount factor. Section III focus on the perfect monitoring
case, the rst important result of this paper is presented. Section IV studies the imperfect
random monitoring case. First we look at the distribution of the public signals, then we
characterize the value of the best SSE payo¤, and nally we present our results. Finally,
in Section V we illustrate our ndings, in the framework of some important discrete time
approaches to frequent monitoring presented in the literature.
II. THE MODEL AND THE EXPECTED DISCOUNT FACTOR
Crucial in our problem is how players discount the future. Usually it is assumed that
the stage game is repeated at predetermined moments in time and that players discount
the future according to a common discount factor; we denote it as  . It is also commonly
assumed that players either discount the future according to an exponential or a hyperbolic
discount factor. In either case discounting is convex in time. For that reason and for
convenience, without loss in generality we implicitly assume exponential discounting  
e r . Where r is the discount rate and  is the interval of time between repetitions of the
stage game, usually assumed equal to the unit. Here we will not make assumptions about
the value of  and we consider also the possibility of this parameter to be a random variable.
Then the discount factor is no more a deterministic but rather a stochastic function of time.
At moments in time 0; 1; 2; :::, each player i 2 N chooses its individual action aki , with
k 2 N = f0; 1; 2; :::g, from some nite action space Aki . Where 0 = 0 is the known moment
in time where players play for the rst time, 1 is the moment in time where players play for
the second time, and so on. Denote Ak = ni=1Aki as the set of action proles endowed with
the product topology of the individual action spaces, with generic element ak = (ak1 ; :::; a
k
2 )
3 Under random monitoring, the monitoring events are random variables with support in some interval,
when in expected terms these events match the deterministic and equally spaced monitoring moments;
we use the terminology "same monitoring frequency (or intensity)". In expected terms the monitoring
events happen the same number of times, see expression (2.2) below.
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denoting a prole of actions.
At moments in time 1; 2; :::, players simultaneously observe a continuously available
signal which provides noisy information about the action prole that has resulted from each
player individual and private decisions. Actions are taken in the beginning of each period
but payo¤s are only collected in the end of the period4.
Under the expected utility hypothesis, the player is ex-ante expected payo¤ at time k,
denoted as i (ak), is the relevant element for studying the game.
Player is2 N = f1; :::; ng innite sum of payo¤s5 from the repeated game is then given
by
1i (a
0) + 2i (a
1) + 3i (a
2) + ::::
As mentioned before, the sequence of times 1; 2; ::: might be predetermined and known
at the beginning of the game with each consecutive time being equally spaced in time
k   k 1 =  , or it might be unknown with each value k, k 2 N, being repeatedly draw
from some known distribution6. The former case we will call it deterministic monitoring
while the second we will call it random monitoring.
When the repetitions of the stage game are random, since the stage game payo¤s of the
repeated game are independent of time, the expected discounted stream of payo¤s is given
by
E (1)i (a
0) + E (2)i (a
1) + E (3)i (a
2) + ::::
= E (x)i (a
0) + E (x)2 i (a
1) + E (x)3 i (a
2) + ::::
Where we have made use of the fact that k = k 1+xk, where xk is some random variables,
and x0 = 0 = 0 is known. Recursively we nd that k =
Pk
j=0 xj. The expected discount
factor for each moment in time is then,
E (k) = E


Pk
j=0 xj

=
Yk
j=0
E (xj) = E (x)k ;
4 This approach is more appealling. As usual, an appropriated normalization will turn the payo¤s of the
innitely repeated game in the same units as the stage game.
5 In a context of imperfect monitoring we call it the innite sum of the ex-ante expected payo¤s of the
repeated game. In such a setting we also assume that this ex-ante expected payo¤s are independent of
the monitoring intensity, i.e. the stage game payo¤s do not depend on  .
6 We abstain here to discuss on how players are informed about the time to play the stage game. Rather
we focus in studying the associated expected payo¤s. However, we can think of a public correlated signal.
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where in last equality we have assumed that each xk is i.i.d. across time7.
Let the random variable x follows some continuous di¤erentiable distribution G (x) with
support on the interval (0; ) where  > 0. It means that during the time interval (0; )
a monitoring event occurs, however, not exactly known when. Then the expected discount
factor is denoted and equals
E (x) 
Z 
0
e rxdG (x) : (2.1)
In order to make comparisons between deterministic and random monitoring meaningful,
the value of  > 0 is chosen, such that it solves
E (x) =
Z 
0
xdG (x) = : (2.2)
Now depending on whether we consider perfect or imperfect public monitoring we develop
each specic aspects in the respective section.
III. PERFECT MONITORING
When studying perfect monitoring with random repetitions of the stage game, the only
relevant aspect that changes is the discount factor due to the time uncertainty brought to
the problem by the random monitoring. When the stage game is repeated at predetermined
and equal spaced moments in time players discount the future according to  on the other
hand when the repetitions are not predetermined the discount factor to apply is E (x). In
the previous section we have seen the di¤erence between these discount factors.
Before go further, we develop some more notation while we review some important con-
cepts in repeated games. Following Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) a payo¤ prole
is a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium if after a given prole of actions there are
associated continuation payo¤s that are themselves subgame-perfect equilibrium of the con-
tinuation game.
More formally, denote V p  Rn the set of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria pay-
o¤s. If for each action prole a there are credible continuation promises w (a) 2 V p such
7 We can obtained the same result if instead, we had computed the recursive interacted conditional expec-
tation E (E (:::E (E (k jk 1) jk 2) :::j1) j0) = E (x)k, for k = k 1 + x, with the expectation taken
w.r.t. the i.i.d. random variables x.
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that for each player i 2 N , and all a0i 2 Ai,
vi = (1   )i (a) + wi (a)  (1   )i
 
a0i; a

 i

+ wi
 
a0i; a

 i

;
then (by the inequality) the prole a is enforceable (i.e. incentive compatible) on V p and
the payo¤ prole v 2 V p is a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria8.
With just a slight increase of notation the same concepts generalize with random monitor-
ing, by simply substituting  for E (x). For our proposes is enough to distinguish eV p  Rn
as the set of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria payo¤s under random monitoring.
We can now present our rst result. Fix a monitoring intensity  = E (x), in deterministic
or random terms. Suppose we have a particular pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium
payo¤ prole v that can be sustained both by monitoring randomly, i.e. v 2 eV p or by
monitoring in a deterministic way, i.e. v 2 V p. Then we may ask, under which conditions
one type of monitoring requires a lower discount factor than the other? The following result
establishes such a condition for perfect monitoring in a general setting.
Theorem 1 Given an monitoring intensity  = E (x), to sustain a particular pure-strategy
subgame-perfect equilibrium payo¤ prole v, random monitoring requires a lower discount
factor than deterministic monitoring if x 2 (0; 1) is strictly convex in x.
Proof. Assuming all the conditions for pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria are satis-
ed. In the deterministic monitoring case, enforceability of the prole a, with respect to
continuations in V p, requires that
  sup
i2N and a0i2Ai
i
 
a0i; a

 i
  i (a)
i
 
a0i; a

 i
  i (a) + wi (a)  wi  a0i; a i  v;
and E (x)  v in the random monitoring case with continuations in eV p. Where
i
 
a0i; a

 i
  i (a) and wi (a)  wi  a0i; a i  vpi where vpi  min
a i2A i
max
ai2Ai
i (ai; a i).
Given a same equilibrium payo¤ v 2 V p and v 2 eV p, random monitoring requires a lower
discount factor than deterministic monitoring if E (x) >  , which is always true by Jensens
inequality when x is convex, since  = E (x) > 0.
8 We directly assume that any value v and w (a) belongs to V p, for that reason we do not mention the
"largest self-generating property" of the set of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria payo¤s.
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Since the monitoring is perfect and we assume a general payo¤ prole v that is subgame-
perfect equilibrium under deterministic and random monitoring, the associated lower bound
on discounting does not depend on r and  . For that reason the result is just centered
around the comparison between discount factors.
We stress that it is commonly assumed that players discount the future in a convex way,
according to either an exponential or a hyperbolic discount factor. For that reason it is
very unlikely that conditions of the theorem stops to hold. Under perfect monitoring, only
when x is not strictly convex or when the distribution of the random time is degenerate
the theorem does not apply.
Numerical Example: As an illustration, suppose that x  U (0; ) with  = 2 ,
implying that E (x) =  as required in Theorem 1. A folk theorem9 in pure-strategies for
the prisonersdilemma of Table I can be obtained providing that players discount factor 
is greater than 2=3. The same folk theorem can be obtained with random monitoring with
a lower discount factor of 0:645901. Similarly if we allow player to use public correlation we
can obtain a folk theorem with a discount factor of 0:243968, rather than 1=310.
The numerical example demonstrate that a lower discount factor is needed to obtain a
particular folk theorem under random monitoring. We can also reinterpret Theorem 1 by
saying that there are payo¤s which cannot be sustained under deterministic monitoring, but
can be sustained as pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria payo¤s if the repetitions of the
stage game are unknown to the players. The following result formalizes this intuition.
Corollary 2 When the conditions of Theorem ... hold, then for a given discount rate r and
an expected monitoring intensity  , there are pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria payo¤s
that can be sustained only under random monitoring, the converse is not true.
Proof. When x 2 (0; 1) is strictly convex in x and E (x) =  by Jensens inequality we
have E (x) >  . Then exist equilibria where  >  and on same time it happens that
E (x) > , for some combinations of r and  . The converse requires  > E (x) which
clearly cannot be true if the conditions of Theorem 1 hold.
9 We say that a folk theorem exist if any feasible and strictly individual rational payo¤ is contained in the
set of subgame-perfect equilibria payo¤s. For folk theorems with discounting in innitely repeated games,
see the classical papers of Friedman (1971) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
10 Mailath and Samuelson (2006, sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.6) show how to obtain these values for the perfect
deterministic monitoring case.
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The result tell us that depending on r and  , the set of subgame-perfect equilibria obtained
with deterministic monitoring is a subset of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria obtained
with random monitoring, that is V p  eV p.
Numerical Example (revisited): In face of Corollary 2 we can reinterpret the above
numerical example in di¤erent ways. Suppose  = 0:65 then with deterministic monitoring
we must be able to sustain a great number of equilibria but not a folk theorem since  <
2=3. However, with random monitoring we get E (x) = 0:670291 > 2=3, allowing us to
sustain any feasible and weakly individual rational payo¤ prole. Similarly, when public
correlation is allowed, if  = 0:3 we can sustain simply the innite repetition of the stage
game Nash equilibria, however with random monitoring we can obtain a folk theorem since
E (x) = 0:377916 > 1=311.
Notice that when the monitoring is random, playerstrue discount factor does not change.
However, under the expected utility hypothesis, their decisions are based on the expected
discount factor, which has become larger. This reects the intuition behind these results.
The uncertainty about the moments where the stage game is repeated brings uncertainty
about the value of gains that a potential deviator may contemplate. In expected terms they
get smaller, the continuation value of the game becomes more important. In some sense it
is equivalent as to say that under perfect random monitoring players become more patient.
One aspect that we did not explore in detail in this section, was the expected discount
factor e¤ect that tends to be stronger for lower frequencies of monitoring (equivalently -
lower discount factor). Such can be seen in the numerical examples above. This fact will
shows extremely useful to interpret the results of Section V.
IV. IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING
As show in the previous section, the superiority of random monitoring in the context of
perfect monitoring is absolute12 when the discount factor is convex. The same it is not true
in games with imperfect monitoring. The di¤erence is that together with the discount factor,
11 Stahl, II (1991) discuss in detail the discountinuity on the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium payo¤s with
public correlation.
12 We say that random monitoring is superior in absolute terms to deterministic monitoring when for a given
parameterization of the problem, it achieves larger payo¤s for all monitoring intensities.
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the distribution of the public signals is also a¤ected by the uncertainty on the repetitions of
the stage game. We can however establish conditions on when one monitoring technology is
superior to the other.
For simplicity, we will consider general symmetric nite stage games which have a least one
symmetric Nash equilibria (potentially mixed), that players use to coordinate the mutual
punishments13. We focus on strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE henceforth), where after
every public history the same action is chosen by both players. A strategy is public if in
any moment in time where players are required to play the stage game, it depends only on
the public histories and not on player i private history. Given a public history, a prole of
public strategies that induces a Nash equilibrium on the continuation game from that time
on, is called a perfect public equilibrium (PPE). Moreover if the other players  i are playing
public strategies, player is best reply can only be a public strategy.
Player is2 N payo¤s in the innitely repeated game is the discounted normalized sum of
the stage-game expected payo¤s, (1   )
1P
t=0;1;2;:::
ti (a
t), induced by the prole of actions
at and associated public history, for every t = 0; 1; 2; ::: and 0 = 0.
A. The Distributions of the Public Signals
Denote by Y (a) the random variable associated with the state of the stochastic process
when observed at the moments in time  and denote by eY (a) the random variable associated
with the state of the stochastic process when the observation time is also a random variable14.
Notice the dependence of these random variables on the action prole a that results from
the private choices made by each of the player. The equal  in the notation emphasizes that
the monitoring intensity is the same.
In general terms for  = E (x) an observation of the public signal either suggests coop-
erative behavior which we call "a good signals" and denote it as y and ey depending on
whether we are considering deterministic or random monitoring respectively, or suggests de-
13 We have restricted the set of games in a considerable way, we do this in order to make the problem more
tractable. Such restriction does not diminuish in any way the point this paper wants to clearly address.
14 As before assume that time is a random variable with some continuous diferentiable distribution G (x)
with support on the interval (0; ) where  > 0. In order to make comparations between deterministic
and random monitoring meaningfull,  is chosen such that E (x) =  . Our concern is that monitoring
intensity will be the same.
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fective behavior, which we call "a bad signals" and analogously denote as y

and ey

. Then,
depending on whether we are considering deterministic or random monitoring we observe
y 2
n
y

; y
o
or ey 2 ney ;eyo respectively.
The partition is convenient, what matters for the players is the information content of
the public signal. For example a realized public signal y or ey might take any value in R,
the partition of the signal space has integrated the interpretation given by the players to
each public signal, reducing this innite space to just two signals. The public history of the
game is just a binary sequence of "good" and "bad" signals15.
The probability of observing a "bad public signal" di¤ers depending on whether we con-
sider deterministic or randommonitoring. In the deterministic case, given a prole of actions
a where each of the players privately plays the equilibrium action, we denote the probability
of a "bad signal" as
F  Pr

Y (a
) 2 y


:
When the repetitions of the stage game are random variables, we denote this probability as
eF  PreY (a) = ey :
When the resulting prole (denoted as a0) has implicit a unilateral deviation by a single
player, these probabilities are denoted respectively as F 0 and eF 0.
In order for the action prole a to be enforceable clearly we must have
n
Y (a
) 2 y

o
n
Y (a
0) 2 y

o
and
neY (a) = eyo  neY (a0) = eyo implying that F 0 > F and eF 0 > eF
respectively16.
Note also that the discounting process is independent from the decision process. In
other words, the expected discount factor and the probabilities of the di¤erent signals are
computed separately. Nonetheless, for a same monitoring frequency, the probability of a
given signal is sensitive on whether the observation time is or not a random variable.
15 To give some intuition on what the sets y

or ey

might be. In the Brownian motion case a "bad signals"
is just an observation of the public signal below a given threshold, in Poisson "bad news" case it is just
a single or more sudden movements in the public signal path, in the Poisson "good news" case it is the
total or parcial absence of movements in the public path. See Section V.
16 For more elaboarated informative conditions on the public signals see Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin
(1994), and also Fudenberg and Levine (1994).
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B. The Best Strong Symmetric Equilibrium
In this section we will rst derive the expression for the best SSE payo¤s under determin-
istic monitoring, and then we simply generalize it to the random monitoring case. Finally
we present the conditions under which random monitoring is superior to deterministic mon-
itoring.
To shorten on notation, since the setting is symmetric and the recursive structure of the
problem is preserved, we respectively drop playersand time indices. Where by symmetry,
 (a0) is equal to all players, i.e. the most likely deviation is the same for all the players and
for any value of  . The same applies to  (a) and 
 
aN

.
In the deterministic case we denote v and v respectively as the upper and the lower
bounds on the set of SSE payo¤s. In other words v is the expected value when the play
starts with the observation of a good signal and v is the expected value of the game when
play starts with an observation of a bad signal.
We apply Abreu, Pearce and Staccetti (1986 and 1990) bang-bang result for strongly
symmetric equilibria. The restrictions we imposed on the structure of the stage game under
consideration allow us to write playersproblem in a tractable way and solve it using simple
dynamic programming methods.
The expected normalized payo¤ v is the sum of two components; the immediate nor-
malized expected payo¤  associated with the equilibrium prole, plus, the sum of the
discounted value associated with a good signal v, which happens with probability 1   F ,
and the lower value v if a bad signal is observed, which happen with probability F . The
best SSE payo¤, with correlation on some public signal, is just the largest value v,
v = (1   ) (a) +  [(1  F ) v + F (v + (1  ) v)] ; (4.1)
that satises
v  (1   ) (a0) +  [(1  F 0) v + F 0 (v + (1  ) v)] ; (4.2)
and
v  v    aN : (4.3)
The rst constraint guarantee that the equilibrium prole a is enforceable by some
symmetric continuation value. The expected value of the game associated with the strongly
12
symmetric prole, has to be at least as good as the expected value of the game associated
with a potential unilateral deviation. The second set of constraint requires that the value v
is individual rational and larger than v, and that the value associated with the punishment
stage v is credible. When this last set of constraint is meet we say that v and v are feasible.
A necessary condition for optimality requires condition (4.1) to hold with equality. Pro-
viding that  is large enough, for it to be the case, when required we allow players to
correlate their actions on some public signal17. In this case a "bad" observation of the
process is interpreted as a "bad signal" with probability 1   . Then  is the probability
with which players ignore a public signal that suggest deviating behavior. We can return to
the general case without public correlation by setting  = 0.
Solving equations (4.1) and (4.2) for v and v, in the general case with public correlation
we obtain
v =  (a)  F
F 0   F ( (a
0)   (a)) ; (4.4)
and
v = v   1
1  
1  

 (a0)   (a)
F 0   F ; (4.5)
which are expressed exclusively as functions of the parameters of the model.
Since  (a) >  (a0) and F 0 > F the second term on the RHS of (4.5) is always non-
negative, the rst inequality in (4.3) is then clearly satised. Then we simply say that
a particular pair of values v and v are feasible if they satisfy the constraint v    aN.
When this conditions fails, no equilibria either than the innite repetition of the static Nash
equilibrium can be sustained, i.e. v = 
 
aN

.
Similarly when the length between repetitions of the stage game is uncertain, ev and ev
have equivalent interpretations. They are respectively the extreme upper and the lower SSE
payo¤s when the repeated game is played at random moments in time. Following arguments
analogous to the ones used to derive expressions (4.4) and (4.5) for the deterministic case,ev and ev can be expressed exclusively as functions of the parameters of the model, that is
ev =  (a)  eFeF 0   eF ( (a0)   (a)) ; (4.6)
17 Public correlation on some public signals is needed in the Poisson process case for condition (4.2) to bind.
Instead of correlate on the public signals we could have employed strategies that ignore with certainty one
or more "bad" observation of the public process, however public correlation does not present the same
integer problems.
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and ev = ev   1
1  e 1  E (
x)
E (x)
 (a0)   (a)eF 0   eF ; (4.7)
where ev >   aN is the value of the best SSE payo¤ with random monitoring when ev 

 
aN

18.
Among all the feasible punishment schemes, the largest SSE payo¤ is attained using the
most severe punishment available19, i.e. perpetual play of a stage game Nash equilibrium.
Then the decision rule (when possible) is chosen to return the largest SSE payo¤, conditioned
to v = 
 
aN

(ev =   aN in the random monitoring case). Clearly when we consider public
correlation on public signals, a bad observation of the public signal does not necessarily result
in the immediate execution of the punishment rule.
As a consequence the two point sets


 
aN

; v
	
and
n

 
aN

;evo associated with deter-
ministic and random monitoring respectively are self-generating. The continuation values
are themselves elements on these sets.
C. E¢ ciency Gains with Random Monitoring
In Section III it was shown that for any equilibrium and all monitoring intensities, perfect
random monitoring always allows e¢ ciency gains with respect to perfect deterministic mon-
itoring. Even though no changes occurred on players true discount factor, their decisions
where based on a larger discount factor. We call it, the expected discount factor e¤ect, and
it was the key for the obtained results.
Under imperfect public randommonitoring the expected discount factor e¤ect still present
and with the same intensity. The di¤erence is that now the uncertainty on the repetitions
18 Where for the case of repeated games played at random moments in time, the probability e is denoted
and given by e = 1  1  E (x)
E (x)
 (a0)   (a)eF 0 ( (a)   (aN ))  eF ( (a0)   (aN )) :
A simmilarly expression with F 0 and F instead of eF 0 and eF respectively and without expectation on the
discount factor gives the case when time is deterministic.
19 Since the our concern is mainly on Brownian and Poisson type processes, the assumptions is without loss
in generality. The Brownian motion is a Gaussian process and the distribution of the public signals is not
convex in all of its domain, perpectual punishment is then the most e¢ cient way to provide incentives, see
Porter (1983). Similarly result can be show for a Poisson process with public correlation over the public
signals.
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of the stage game also a¤ect the distribution of the public signals, whether or not there was
a deviation by any of the players. It is clear that F 0 > F and eF 0 > eF for all monitoring
intensities, however we cannot establish such precise relations when comparing the likelihood
ratios eF 0= eF and F 0=F . As pointed by Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) the value of the
likelihood ratio is crucial, so thus it is here the comparison between these two likelihood
ratios.
The following result establish conditions under which imperfect public randommonitoring
allows gains in e¢ ciency.
Theorem 3 For a given monitoring intensity  = E (x), the upper bound on the set of SSE
payo¤ of an innitely repeated game at random moments in time ev, is larger than the upper
bound associated with the repeated game at deterministic moments in time v;
(i) if
F eF 0 > F 0 eF ;
when v = 
 
aN

and ev =   aN, or
(ii) if eF 0   (a)    aN > eF   (a0)    aN ;
when v < 
 
aN

and ev =   aN.
Proof. (i) When for a given monitoring intensity  = E (x) and associated discount factors
we can nd decision rules such that both v = 
 
aN

and ev =   aN hold, then both ev and
v attain values larger than 
 
aN

. We need to compare the value of the best SSE payo¤ in
each case, i.e. ev > v. Then the comparison between expressions (4.6) and (4.4) is equivalent
to, after some arrangements,
F
F 0   F >
eFeF 0   eF ;
rearranging again, we obtain the desired condition
F eF 0 > F 0 eF :
(ii) When for a given monitoring intensity  and associated discount factors we can nd
decision rules such that ev =   aN holds, but not v =   aN. Then ev >   aN while
v = 
 
aN

. With imperfect public random monitoring we can sustain equilibria payo¤s
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above the static Nash but not with perfect public deterministic monitoring. Then the
condition is that ev > N , or equivalently
 (a) 
eFeF 0   eF ( (a0)   (a)) > N :
After some rearrangements we obtain the desired inequality
eF 0   (a)    aN > eF   (a0)    aN :
The superiority of random monitoring relative to deterministic monitoring shown in Sec-
tion III does not generalize in such an absolute way with imperfect public monitoring20.
Theorem 3 tell us when such superior is possible. While in point (ii) only random monitor-
ing achieve equilibria payo¤s above the static Nash, in (i) we can sustain payo¤s above the
static Nash with both monitoring technologies, the issue is then to nd conditions where
random monitoring is superior to deterministic monitoring. Outside the cases stated in
Theorem 3, either we say that random monitoring is equivalent to deterministic monitoring
or that the former is less e¢ cient.
The idea is that trough the expected discount factor e¤ect the future has become more
important, but it might also has become more uncertain due to the e¤ect on the distribution
of the public signals. A clear answer depends on the relation between di¤erent likelihood
ratios.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES - THE PRISONERSDILEMMA
In this section we provide a numerical example of the value of the best SSE payo¤
when monitoring is random and when it is deterministic. For the case where monitoring is
imperfect but public we study when e¢ ciency gains are possible under random monitoring,
on the context of the work of Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991), Fudenberg and Levine
(2007), Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) and Osório-Costa (2008). These papers main concern
20 Recall that we say that random monitoring (deterministic monitoring) is superior in absolute terms
to deterministic monitoring (random monitoring) when for a given parameterization of the problem, it
achieves larger payo¤s for all monitoring intensities.
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1 0
1 2; 2  1; 3
0 3; 1 0; 0
TABLE I: A PrisionersDilemma - Stage Game Payo¤s
is on the limit case ( ! 0), however, we extend their approach for more general monitoring
frequencies.
To illustrate it, we consider that at each moment in time 0; 1; 2; :::, players repeatedly
play the prisonersdilemma stage game of Table I.
Provide no e¤ort is a dominate strategy for both players. The minimax value of the game
coincides with the stage game Nash payo¤s and equals 0 for both players.
A. Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) Approach
In their paper, Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) tailor their approach to answer the
limit case questions ( ! 0), here we are also interested in other monitoring intensities.
We simplify their setting by assuming that there are only two possible public signals at any
time  ; the case where there is no observed events, and the case where one or more events
are observed21. This allows us to work with the exponential distribution rather than with a
sum of Poisson distributions, equal to the number of relevant events chosen in some optimal
way22.
Players, after a bad observation of the public signal, condition their actions (in particular
the perpetual punishment decision) on some publicly observed random variable. There is a
probability  (or e) with which players ignore a bad signal, and makes condition (4.2) hold
with equality.
21 The interpretation given to each of these two cases depend on whether we are considering the "bad news"
or the "good news" case. More about it below.
22 Even in the latter case we were not able to solve the integer problem refered in Footnote 17. The resourse
to public correlation is still required in order for condition (4.2) to hold with equality.
17
1. The bad news case  >  > 0
In this case one or more observed movements in the public process are interpreted as
bad news with probability 1   (or 1  e). Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) have shown
that in the limit equilibrium payo¤s above the static Nash but not e¢ cient can be sustained
depending on the value of the parameters  and  with respect to r. In this case the value
of the best SSE payo¤s improve monotonically with the monitoring intensity23.
Independently of the monitoring frequency, smaller the ratio = larger the payo¤s that
can the achieved. For given parameterization of the problem, i.e. = su¢ ciently small and
 su¢ ciently large we observe random monitoring being superior to deterministic monitoring
in the sense of part (i) of Theorem 3 while  2 ( ; +] and superior in the sense of part (ii)
of Theorem 3 while  2 (+; ]. Deterministic monitoring is then superior for small values
of  . This result is explained by the expected discount factor e¤ect that tends to be stronger
for lower frequencies of monitoring.
Randommonitoring can only be superior in absolute terms when we let the ratio =! 0.
.
(insert gure about here r = 0:1,  = 1,  = 3 and  = 10 )
.
When the ratio = is su¢ ciently large deterministic monitoring may be superior in a
absolute terms24.
Clearly the value of (4.4) and (4.6) do not vary with the discount rate r. However,
a larger value of r (lower discounting) reduces the set of monitoring frequencies that can
sustain payo¤s above the static Nash. This is true for random and deterministic monitoring.
2. The good news case  >  > 0
In this case, it is the lack of observed movements in the public process that are interpreted
as "bad signals". Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) have shown that when  gets small
"bad signals" become very likely (innitely likely in the limit) and the only equilibria that
23 Osório-Costa (2008) reports a similar monotonic result when the public signals are Brownian. However,
his result is e¢ cient in the limit.
24 This happen when for any monitoring intensity,  and e never cross and  > e.
18
can be sustained is the innite repetition of the stage game static Nash equilibria.
.
(insert gure about here, r = 0:1,  = 5,  = 3 and  = 1 )
.
In the "good news" case random monitoring does not improving on the best SSE payo¤ in
the sense of Theorem 3 part (i). Deterministic monitoring is in general superior in absolute
terms, with exception for the cases where the ratio = is su¢ ciently large, where we can
observe random monitoring being superior in accordance with Theorem 3 part (ii)25. In this
way random repeated monitoring can at most enlarge the spectrum of monitoring intensities
in which payo¤s above the static Nash can be sustained.
B. Fudenberg and Levine (2007)/Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) Approach
For the same initial condition, Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz
(2007) are equivalent approaches to frequent monitoring. For that reason we treat them
together. As reported in these papers, we observe a degeneracy of the set of SSE for high
monitoring intensities. A result parallel to the one obtained by Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce
(1991) in the good news case.
Away from the limit, a large value of  or r, have negative e¤ects on the payo¤s26.
.
(insert gure about here, with zoom)
.
While in other approaches, random monitoring when superior, it is for monitoring inten-
sities  >  , here it happens the opposite. For su¢ ciently low , we may nd an interval
of high monitoring intensities (low ) where random monitoring is superior in the sense of
Theorem 3 part (ii)27, then as  increases there is a subsequent interval where random mon-
itoring dominates in the sense of Theorem 3 part (i). After that deterministic monitoring
becomes superior.
25 This happens when  and e cross once. Notice also that, here in the "good new case", a larger ratio =
has positive e¤ects on the value of the best SSE.
26 For su¢ ciently large values of  no equilibria can be sustained for any monitoring intensity.
27 Before that interval, i.e. for even higher monitoring intensities, both random and deterministic monitoring
return degenerated payo¤s.
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C. Osório-Costa (2008) Approach
In this setting a low observations of the public signal is interpreted as a "bad signals".
The decision rule that separates "good" from "bad" signals is explained in great detail in
Osório-Costa (2008). In this paper e¢ cient results are obtained in the limit and payo¤s
improve monotonically with the monitoring intensity. The monotonicity result is similar to
the one described above for the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) bad news case.
.
(insert gure about here r = 0:1,  = 3,  = 12 and  = 20)
.
Independently of the monitoring frequency, smaller the uncertainty parameter  larger the
payo¤s that can the achieved. We observe randommonitoring being superior to deterministic
monitoring according to Theorem 3 part (i) while  2 ( ; +] and superior in accordance
with Theorem 3 part (ii) while  2 (+; ]28. As we increase , random monitoring stops
to dominate in the sense of part (i) of Theorem 3 and dominates exclusively in the sense
of part (ii). When  gets su¢ ciently large deterministic monitoring dominates in absolute
terms.
If there is an interval of monitoring intensities for which random monitoring is superior,
that interval does not vanish with varying r, however, its measure does. Low values of r
have positive e¤ects on the payo¤s.
APPENDIX A:
APPENDIX B:
28 In this case the optimal decision rule for the deterministic and the random monitoring case cross twice.
Also, independently of , deterministic monitoring tends to be superior for small values of  .
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